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Abstract Rent-to-own (RTO) is attractive to ﬁnancially distressed consumers. 
It allows immediate access to merchandise and an opportunity for eventually acquisi­
tion. Yet goods can be returned at any point without penalty or other adverse conse­
quences. We use a competing risk methodology that accounts for unobserved consumer 
heterogeneity to study how contracts conclude, estimating the probabilities of exit— 
via return, purchase, or skip—and the associated durations. The estimated outcome 
probabilities highlight the use of the embedded return option by RTO consumers and 
the trade-offs and cross-subsidization implicit in the RTO contractual arrangement. We 
offer rational and behavioral explanations of consumer behavior in the RTO market, 
which we believe can be generalized to other consumer loan markets. 
Keywords Competing risks · Unobserved heterogeneity · Transaction data · 
Consumer credit · Payment schedule · Sub-prime lending 
JEL Classiﬁcation C24 · D14 · G29 
1 Introduction 
This article studies the nature of rent-to-own (RTO) transactions. Since its begin­
nings in the 1960s, the RTO industry has grown to over 8,000 stores in the US, 
annually serving over 3 million customers, generating over $5 billion in revenue 
(APRO 2001). The clientele consists primarily of disadvantaged consumers having 
restricted access to alternative (conventional) ﬁnancing mechanisms such as credit 
cards or bank loans.1 The RTO transaction allows a customer immediate access to 
new or used merchandise—most commonly appliances, electronics, or furniture— 
with neither a credit check nor down payment in exchange for a rental payment due 
either weekly, bi-weekly, or monthly. Delivery, set up, and service are typically also 
bundled in the contract. The agreement has a ﬁxed contractual term, usually from 12 
to 24 months; and, by making all payments, or exercising an early purchase option, 
the consumer acquires the merchandise. At the same time, goods can be returned, at 
any point, without penalty or other adverse consequences. The option to rent or to 
purchase thus remains with the customer over the life of the contract. How this con­
tract is actually used is interesting, in and of itself, and has been a subject of debate 
among consumer advocates and others.2 Despite the importance of these issues, basic 
questions have been answered only anecdotally and deﬁnitive empirical stylized facts 
are not available. 
The nature of the RTO transaction—rental or purchase agreement—is a key policy 
question. The industry is pursuing national legislation classifying it as a lease, while 
some states have classiﬁed it as an installment credit agreement. Clearly, if it is most 
appropriately described as a purchase then this transaction is usurious. This is partly 
an empirical question judged by how the contract is actually being used by consum­
ers, e.g., the probability of purchase and the expected duration of the agreement. In 
this article, we analyze a unique data set of some 7,500 detailed transactional records 
to better understand RTO usage. We employ a multiple destination (competing risk) 
framework to explore how and when a given contract concludes, where conclusion 
occurs in one of three ways (exits): return, purchase, or skip. In particular, “return” 
means payments cease and the merchandise is returned to the store, perhaps involun­
tarily. “Purchase” means ownership is transferred to the customer, possibly through 
the exercise of an early purchase option. “Skip,” also referred to as a “default” or “write 
off,” is when payments prematurely stop but the merchandise cannot be recovered by 
the store for some reason—“the customer skipped with it.” 
It is well documented that the primary market for RTO is the “working poor.” Along 
with other subprime lenders—e.g., payday lenders and pawn shops—RTO functions, 
in part, to provide credit for those who are otherwise not credit-worthy. One major 
difference is that a RTO agreement has several embedded options. First and fore­
most, the agreement carries the right of return. This is, at any point, at the customer’s 
instigation, the merchandise can be return to the store and the agreement terminated. 
This is valuable for a customer who has only a short term need or, more importantly, 
1 For example, the FTC in their survey of RTO customers (Federal Trade Commission 2000) report that 
among consumers using RTO in the last year 56.3% (36.1%) did not have a credit card (checking account) 
versus a national rate of 33.5% (15.0%). 
2 For example, Freedman (1993) notes the high annual percentage interest rates and Walden (1990) argues 
that RTO prices substantially exceed dealer cost, while Hill et al. (1998) argue that prices cannot be justiﬁed 
by the return option or other services offered. Anderson and Jackson (2001), Swagler and Wheeler (1989), 
and Zikmund-Fisher and Parker (1999) examine consumer experience and motivation for entering into a 
RTO agreement. 

 
uncertainty over the precise length of need. It also makes the transaction a rental 
with no adverse credit impact, making the transaction well suited to someone fac­
ing uncertainty regarding his/her ability to make the required payments. Additionally, 
this option feature is potentially quite valuable as it allows one to sidestep the “credit 
trap” occurring with, say, payday lending (e.g., Stegman and Faris 2003).3 Second, the 
contract also offers the option to early purchase, i.e., to terminate the contract at any 
point and take ownership of the merchandise by paying a proportion of the remaining 
payments—typically about one half (see, e.g., Federal Trade Commission 2000). This 
is valuable for a consumer, with insufﬁcient means to acquire desired merchandise, 
who experiences an improvement in fortune. Both of these embedded options explain 
why one would expect the typical length of a contract to be less than the contractual 
term set by the store. 
In this article, we estimate the return, purchase, and skip terminal probabilities 
and the actual length of the contracts which together provide insight into the use of 
embedded options. Our analysis is aided by rich details of consumer transactions as 
opposed to other studies that are based on relatively small survey data which may be 
prone to misreporting. For instance, the well-documented study of RTO by the Federal 
Trade Commission (2000) surveyed 524 customers to produce primarily descriptive 
analysis.4 While our descriptive analysis of consumer demographics is consistent with 
theirs, the outcome variables are quite different. For instance, we ﬁnd that only 23.6% 
of completed RTO contracts represent a purchase, which is starkly lower than 64.3% 
as reported by the FTC study. 
The statistical model in this article accounts for both observed and unobserved 
sources of heterogeneity. Observed heterogeneity includes factors representing cus­
tomer demographics as well as the structure of the contract. Regarding demographics, 
we expect a picture of the “working poor” to emerge. At the same time, it is not clear 
what will be the impact on the exit probabilities of such things as age or income, as 
theories could be formulated positing various relations to outcome. It is even more 
interesting to evaluate the impact of how the contracts are structured. For instance, in 
contrast to conventional ﬁnancial arrangements, the customer can pick the payment 
frequency—weekly, bi-weekly, or monthly. The choice could depend, for instance, 
on the length of planned product use or to match one’s paycheck schedule.5 Factors 
such as payment frequency and contractual term are chosen by customers based on 
an evaluation of their ﬁnancial situation and needs. We believe that what they end up 
choosing will further dictate the contract evolution. For instance, the more frequent 
3 This credit trap occurs because one can get access to future cash ﬂows in exchange for a ﬁxed fee. However, 
since such lending appeals to ﬁnancially constrained borrowers, such loans frequently need to be “rolled 
over” with the payment of an additional fee which exacerbates the consumer’s ﬁnancial situation leading to 
further loan demand as well as an ever higher effective APR (Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation 2005). 
4 Lacko et al. (2002) and  McKernan et al. (2003) further analyze the FTC data and include a nice regulatory 
overview. Anderson and Jaggia (2009) analyze transactional data; however, they do not explore the various 
outcomes of an RTO contract. 
5 The payment is determined by the store by marking their product cost up 2 to 3 times (Federal Trade 
Commission 2000) then dividing that into equal monthly amounts, where the contractual term (number of 
payments) is chosen to make the resultant periodic payment attractive to customers. Subsequently, if weekly 
(bi-weekly) is selected the periodic payment will be one fourth (one half) of what would be due monthly. 
the payments, the more one’s attention is focused on the contract, possibly resulting 
in quicker resolution. Similarly, consumers may adjust their decision time scale in 
accordance with the contractual term. These explanations tie in with the behavioral 
literature that suggests that consumers mentally track the cost and beneﬁts of a transac­
tion with symbolic linkage between consumption and the way the purchase is ﬁnanced 
(see, e.g., Prelec and Loewenstein 1998; Thaler 1985). 
Overall, the article contributes useful insights regarding behavior in the relatively 
unexplored RTO market. Apart from a detailed descriptive analysis of the transac­
tional data, we estimate a competing risk model to better understand contract usage. 
The article also illustrates the trade-offs and cross-subsidization implicit in the RTO 
contractual arrangement. We compute effective interest rates for RTO customers which 
are significantly smaller than the generally reported APRs. Finally, we believe that 
our rational and behavioral explanations of consumer behavior in the RTO market can 
be generalized to other consumer loan markets. 
The rest of the article is organized in the following way. The next section outlines 
the competing risk model methodology. Section 3 describes the sample characteristics 
of the data set and the variables used in the model. It also suggests a method to compute 
the annual percentage rates paid by RTO customers. Section 4 discusses the empirical 
results, identifying several empirical regularities. Section 5 concludes. 
2 Methodology 
Multiple destination, or competing risk, models have become increasingly popu­
lar in economics where the duration of an event is terminated by exit to one of 
several mutually exclusive and collectively exhaustive destinations—the competing 
risks (see Lancaster 1990 for an overview). These models have been used to model, 
e.g., unemployment, welfare spells, and mortgage terminations (see Katz and Meyer 
1990; Blank 1989; Deng et al. 2000, respectively). In this article, we employ a com­
peting risk model to explore when and how an RTO contract concludes. In other 
words, based on customer- and contract-speciﬁc variables (observed heterogeneity), 
the model predicts how long the contract lasts and whether it is terminated in a return, 
purchase, or skip. In addition to observed heterogeneity, the statistical model also 
accounts for unobserved characteristics of RTO customers. While the next section 
discusses the data in detail, we ﬁrst want to note the main aspects of our model. 
In our setting, we have three mutually exclusive and collectively exhaustive exits 
(contract conclusions). Let Tr, Tp, Ts be the latent variables that capture the length of 
time of an RTO contract until is terminated by the consumer via return, purchase, or 
skip, respectively. The observed data consist of information on T = min(Tr, Tp, Ts) 
along with indicator variables, Ir, Ip, and Is. T is the actual duration (length of time 
the contract actually ran) of an agreement and the indicator variables deﬁne the mode 
of exit. For instance, Ir = 1 signiﬁes that the contract was terminated by a return. 
A popular speciﬁcation in the literature is to use a proportional hazard model for 
grouped data that allows a ﬂexible baseline hazard (see Han and Hausman 1990; Meyer 
1990). Let the data be divided into M intervals, (d0, d1], (d1, d2], . . ., (dM−1, dM ], 
where the mth interval includes the duration in the (dm−1, dm ] interval. In our sample, 
we use 4-week intervals up to dM = 52 weeks; any duration beyond 52 weeks is 
considered censored.6 Using a proportional hazard model, the conditional probability 
of terminating the RTO contract in the mth interval via route j equals 
(  ) ( ) Pr Tj = m X, η j ; T > m − 1 = 1 − exp −η j exp(X 1β j + δ j,m) (1) 
X is a factor vector representing customer and transaction characteristics; η j 
accounts for unobserved heterogeneity; given a baseline hazard h0, j , δ j,m ≡  
ln( dm h0, j (s)ds) is a parameter that is estimated along with β j ; j = r, p, s. The  dm−1 joint survivor function conditional on X and the unobserved heterogeneities ηr, ηp, 
and ηs is:7 
� � (  )    S mr,mp,ms X, ηr, ηp, ηs = Pr Tr > dmr−1, Tp > dmp−1, Ts > dms−1 X, ηr, ηp, ηs ⎡ 
mr −1 mp−1 L L
= − exp ⎣ηr exp(X 1βr + δr,t ) + ηp exp(X 1βp + δp,t ) 
t=1 t=1 ⎤ 
mLs−1 ⎦+ηs exp(X 1βs + δs,t ) (2) 
t=1 
Due to competing risks, we observe the minimum of the latent durations along with 
an indicator variable that deﬁnes the mode of exit. Consider an RTO contract that (  ) (  )  terminates in the mth interval, let Ir m X, ηr, ηp, ηs ,Ip m X, ηr, ηp, ηs , and (  ) Is m X, ηr, ηp, ηs denote the probabilities of termination via return, purchase, and (  ) skip, respectively, conditional on ηr, ηp, and ηs. Further, deﬁne Ic m X, ηr, ηp, ηs 
as the conditional probability that the RTO contract is right censored, to account for 
the transactions that are still active at the end of the data acquisition period. These 
conditional probabilities are expressed as: 
(  ) (  )  Ir m X, ηr, ηp, ηs = S m,m,m X, ηr, ηp, ηs (  ) −S m + 1,m,m X, ηr, ηp, ηs − cc (3) (  ) (  )  Ip m X, ηr, ηp, ηs = S m,m,m X, ηr, ηp, ηs (  ) −S m,m + 1,m X, ηr, ηp, ηs − cc (4) (  ) (  )  Is m X, ηr, ηp, ηs = S m,m,m X, ηr, ηp, ηs (  ) −S m,m,m + 1 X, ηr, ηp, ηs − cc (5) (  ) (  )  Ic m X, ηr, ηp, ηs = S m,m,m X, ηr, ηp, ηs (6) 
6 Given the sporadic distribution of completed durations, especially in the skip category, we could not extend 
the grid beyond 52 weeks. Due to forced censoring at 52 weeks, the proportion of censored observations 
increased from 14.7% (reported in Table 1) to 22.6%. 
7 McCall (1996) and  Deng et al. (2000) sum  to  m j , in place of m j−1, due to the difference in the construction 
of the grouped duration variable. 
          
  
The correction factor, cc, is necessary because of the discrete nature of the latent 
duration variables. In particular, when an event terminates in a given interval due to 
a particular risk, it implies that that risk’s duration is less than that of any other risk; 
however, termination by another risk is also feasible in that same interval. Therefore, 
following McCall (1996), we use the following adjustment to a three risk model: 
⎡ ( ) ( )⎤ 
2S m,m,m X, ηr, ηp, ηs + S m + 1,m + 1,m + 1 X, ηr, ηp, ηs1 ( ) ( )⎣ ⎦cc = −S (m + 1,m,m X, ηr, ηp, ηs ) − S m,m + 1,m X, ηr, ηp, ηs3 −S m,m,m + 1 X, ηr, ηp, ηs 
(7) 
In order to estimate the model, the distribution of the unobserved heterogeneities 
must be speciﬁed. An attraction of a grouped proportional hazard model is that it 
can easily be extended to incorporate a multi-dimensional discrete distribution for 
the unobserved heterogeneity, thereby allowing correlation between risks (see McCall 
1996; Deng et al. 2000). We model the joint distribution of ηr, ηp, ηs by allowing 
K distinct, though unobservable, groups in the population of RTO customers. Fur­
ther, an RTO customer in group k is characterized by a triplet of location parameters 
(ηr,k , ηp,k , ηs,k ) that occur with relative frequency pk where k = 1, 2, . . ., K and 
k
K 
=1 pk = 1. The location parameters and the mass points, ςk , are estimated along  Kwith other parameters of the model where pk ≡ ςk ( i=1 ςi )−1. For identiﬁcation, 
the mass point ς1 and the shape parameter δ j,1 are normalized. 
For estimation, the unconditional probabilities for j = r, p, s, c are expressed as: 
K L ( )
I j (m |X ) = I j m X, ηr,k , ηp,k , ηs,k pk (8) 
k=1 
The log-likelihood function for the resulting correlated competing risk model is: 
N L{ [ ]
ln L = Ir,i ln [Ir (mi |Xi )] + Ip,i ln Ip (mi |Xi ) + Is,i ln [Is (mi |Xi )] 
i=1  +Ic,i ln [Ic (mi |Xi )] (9) 
The indicator variables Ir,i , Ip,i and Is,i equal 1 if the RTO transaction ends via return, 
purchase, or skip, respectively, and 0 otherwise. Similarly, Ic,i equals 1 for censored 
observations and 0 otherwise. 
3 Sample characteristics 
The data represent detailed transactional records from four stores of a small RTO chain 
in the Southeast and consist of all transactions originated between June 1, 2000 and 
May 31, 2002—a total of 7,517 observations after restricting attention to contracts 
lasting at least 6 months.8 Again, the dependent variable is the actual duration (length 
of time the contract actually ran) of an RTO contract conditional on a given exit and we 
consider three mutually exclusive and collectively exhaustive exits: return, purchase, 
and skip. We note that most customers exercise one of the embedded options—either to 
return or to purchase early—and so the actual running time of the contract is typically 
less than the contractual term that assumes all payments are made. Of the transactions 
in our sample, 85.3% have concluded (see Table 1), either as return (62.2%), purchase 
(20.1%), or skip (3.0%). For the remaining 14.7% of the cases, the contract is still 
active, with the customer continuing to pay rent, resulting in right-censored observa­
tions. For all completed contracts, the average contract duration is 17.15 weeks with 
about 10 weeks for returns and 40 weeks for purchases. 
It is worth pointing out that of all completed contracts, 72.9% end with the item 
returned and only 23.6% represent a purchase. Perhaps surprisingly, these results are 
at variance with the ones reported by the Federal Trade Commission (2000). The FTC 
study is a consumer survey, suggesting that of the transactions completed at the time 
of survey, 64.3% resulted in acquisition. This discrepancy can be partly reconciled by 
considering the data sets’ emphases, i.e., survey versus transaction-based. While sur­
vey data are prone to misreporting, transaction data have some tendency to overstate 
return as a customer may instigate several transactions before eventual merchandise 
acquisition. Further, our data show a substantial amount of unrecovered merchandise 
which is unlikely to be reported in a survey—this is the 3.5% of completed transactions 
which are skips (3.0% of total transactions). 
A number of independent variables are postulated to inﬂuence how long an agree­
ment will last and how it will terminate. These variables can be characterized as either 
demographic, contract structure, or repeat customer. More casually, they deal with 
who the customer is, what the contract looks like, and how it is used. They are detailed 
below.9 
Seven demographic variables are considered. Age equals 1 if more than 25 years of 
age (and equals 0 otherwise). Gender is 1 if male. Marital status is 1 if married. 
Employment equals 1 if employed for over 6 months. Income is a qualitative variable 
measured in $1,000s where 1 is for 0–5, 2 for 5–10, 3 for 10–15, 4 for 15–20, 5 for 
20–25, and 6 for more than 25. Government aid equals 1 if the customer receives 
government aid in the form of TANF (temporary aid for needy families), social secu­
rity, or welfare. Referral is 1 if the customer has been referred to the store either 
8 The information is gathered with the cooperation of the Association of Progressive Rental Organiza­
tions (APRO), the industry trade group; High Touch, Inc., the primary supplier of RTO store management 
software; and the anonymous chain owner. Regarding the underlying data, the history of an individual 
transaction is automatically purged 14 months after concluding. To avoid a truncation issue, attention was 
restricted to this 14 month period; and, to extend the available window, the data were regathered at a later 
period and merged. Consequently, some transactions were still on-going at time of collection and thus are 
censored. We have analyzed other store data over different time periods and, despite some variations across 
regions and between urban and rural areas, have found the basic characteristics of the data surprisingly 
consistent. 
9 Given the number of seemingly related variables, especially the demographics, care was taken to address 
possible multicollinearity. Among the diagnostics used, variance inﬂation factors were calculated; these 
ranged from 1.03 to 3.93 with a median of 1.61, suggestive that the data does not suffer from serious 
multicollinearity. 
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directly or by a friend or relative. Taken together, they show a customer base which 
is young, predominately female, unmarried, employed a fairly short period of time in 
their current job for low wages, a high incidence of government assistance, and with 
a significant amount referred (see Table 1). This picture is consistent with existing 
literature, e.g., Lacko et al. (2002). 
Contract structure is captured with three variables. Payment frequency is deﬁned 
as a qualitative variable taking value 1 for weekly, 2 for biweekly, and 4 for monthly 
payment schedule; this metric captures the number of weeks between payments. Max­
imum payable amount is the upper bound on rent paid and equals the periodic 
payment amount multiplied by the total number of payments; measured in $1,000s. 
Contractual term is the maximum length in years of the agreement, if it goes full 
term. Notice these three variables completely capture the ﬁnancial aspect of acquiring 
merchandise by paying to term. Namely, the payment schedule, total due, and con­
tractual period. Roughly, the average is payment every 2 weeks, totaling $1,250 over 
15 months. 
Two repeat customer variables are included. Transactions to date measures 
the number of transactions up to and including the agreement under consideration. 
Repeat customer is 1 if the customer has had several distinct transactions to date. 
As the mean transactions to date is close to 3, multiple transactions are clearly common 
for RTO customers. However, there are several ways to generate multiple deals without 
being a true repeat—e.g., due to service or exchange—and so a dummy is included 
to capture those customers with unrelated transactions, representing some 45% of the 
data set. Importantly, both variables are deﬁned conditional only on information actu­
ally available when a given transaction was initiated. Thus, an endogeneity issue is 
avoided as only chronologically prior transactions (i.e., a priori knowable information) 
are considered in classifying a given transaction as a “repeat” or not. 
Finally, dummy variables are included for the three main merchandise classiﬁca­
tions—Appliances, Electronics, and Furniture. These represent 27.37, 29.77, 
and 35.48% of the transactions, respectively, a total of 92.62% of the data. 
The means and standard deviations of the above variables are presented in Table 1, 
both in terms of the overall sample and for each destination. The t test for the difference 
of means between returns and purchases is also reported. Interestingly, the characteris­
tics of renters are quite distinct from those of the buyers, especially those dealing with 
contract structure. A casual look at the table also suggests that purchasers, relative to 
renters, are more likely to be older consumers who are employed. Renters are more 
likely to be on a weekly payment schedule, especially when the maximum payable 
amount is large. Also, among types of merchandise, electronics are more likely to be 
rented, while appliances and furniture are more likely to be purchased. 
Much noted in the literature and in policy discussions is the high reported annual 
percentage rates (APRs) associated with RTO contracts. Such calculations are, of 
course, based on assuming that consumers make all rental payments until maturity. 
Our transactional database allows us insight into the actual effective rate—i.e., the 
rate based on the actual payments made. To illustrate, suppose an APR of 200% (e.g., 
Zikmund-Fisher and Parker 1999 report a 229.7% APR on a television) then an imputed 
periodic payment along with a markup of total rent to cost can be calculated.10 Using 
the average durations (length of time the contracts actually ran) and contractual terms 
from Table 1 along with an assumption on salvage value, average effective rates can 
then be determined for each destination. Consistent with Federal Trade Commission 
(2000), we assume an early purchase option of 50% of the remaining payments and 
use s = 0.7 as a point estimate of the salvage value for a returned item, s = 0 for  
skips. In our sample, we obtained 192, 66, and −69% for purchase, return, and write 
off, respectively. Further, weighting by the sample proportions from Table 1 yields an 
a priori effective rate of 91%. While this estimate is still quite high, it is much reduced 
from the reported APR. This computation is just for illustration and is based on a con­
servative estimate of salvage value. For instance, if one assumes that the average return 
item retains only 60% of its retail value, the overall effective rate drops to 48%.11 
4 Results 
Table 2 presents the maximum likelihood estimates of the dependent competing risk 
models assuming that there are two distinct population groups of RTO customers (K = 
2).12 In other words, the estimated triplet of location parameters are (ηr1, ηp1, ηs1) for 
one group and (ηr2, ηp2, ηs2) for the other. The difference between these groups may 
be attributed to the unobserved intentions at the initiation of an RTO contract (e.g., 
predisposition to return or purchase) or other unobserved demand or income shocks. 
We start with a brief analysis of the raw (Kaplan–Meier) conditional termination 
rates for RTO transactions. For a given route, these raw termination rates are computed, 
for each of the M intervals deﬁned above, as: 
N j (m)h∗ j (m) = , (10) (dm − dm−1)(N j (m) + Nn(m)) 
where N j (m) represents the number of exits in (dm−1, dm ] to route j and Nn(m) is the 
number of uncensored transactions that are not terminated by dm . Further, we estimate 
the overall conditional termination rates for the competing risk model, evaluated at 
average factor values X , as:  ¯
10 Norming the item’s cost to $1 and letting p be the monthly payment due, d the contract’s actual duration, [ ]
and s the salvage value, the effective interest rate is 12i where i solves p 1 − (1 + i)−d i−1+s(1+i)−d = 
1. While the calculation is conceptually simple, note that the APR of a rental is dependent on the item’s 
estimated drop in value over the rental period, (1 − s), and that the amount of depreciation would vary 
across merchandise. 
11 We discuss APR as it is an important part of the policy debate. We feel, however, that the concept is 
deﬁcient as a cost metric for RTO. The embedded options along with the possibility of ﬁnancial reversal 
among the clientele lead to a very rich set of possible contract evolutions. Consequently, there is likely to be 
significant variance between actual use and the assumed “typical use” employed to calculate APR—thus, 
the true effective cost could be quite different and vary from case to case. 
12 We sought to extend the analysis to three groups (K = 3) however, the location and mass point param­
eters were insignificant; further, the likelihood ratio test corroborated that the two group model was more 
appropriate. 
 
 
Table 2 Estimates of the competing risk model with unobserved heterogeneity 
Parameter Return Purchase Skip 
Age (1 if > 25 years) −0.249∗∗∗ (−4.560) −0.138 (−1.387) −0.465∗∗∗ (−2.834)
 
Gender (1 if male) 0.098* (1.857) −0.143 (−1.445) 0.205 (1.342)
 
Marital status (1 if married) −0.046 (−0.839) 0.044 (0.471) −0.362∗∗ (−2.125)
 
Employment (1 if > 6 months) −0.202∗∗∗ (−3.435) −0.010 (−0.093) −0.012 (−0.072)
 
Income 0.139*** (5.807) 0.048 (1.139) 0.016 (0.215)
 
Government aid (1 if aid) 0.341*** (5.324) 0.124 (1.083) −0.467∗∗ (−2.420)
 
Referral (1 if referred) −0.301∗∗∗ (−5.033) 0.020 (0.189) −0.578∗∗∗ (−2.732)
 
Payment frequency −0.613∗∗∗ (−24.363) 0.065 (1.451) −0.440∗∗∗ (−4.783)
 
(weeks between)
 
Maximum payable amount 0.218*** (8.256) −0.517∗∗∗ (−6.173) 0.024 (0.233)
 
Contractual term −0.510∗∗∗ (−7.034) −3.580∗∗∗ (−24.612) −1.327∗∗∗ (−5.415)
 
Transactions to date 0.047*** (5.014) −0.007 (−0.366) 0.052* (1.837)
 
Repeat customer (1 if repeat) −0.336∗∗∗ (−6.281) −0.064 (−0.675) −0.719∗∗∗ (−4.286)
 
Appliances dummy 0.059 (0.657) 0.300** (2.120) −1.465∗∗∗ (−6.535)
 
Electronics dummy 0.318*** (3.571) 0.163 (1.140) −0.291 (−1.596)
 
Furniture dummy −0.110 (−1.237) 0.476*** (3.555) −1.097∗∗∗ (−5.695)
 
η1 (location parameter) 4.138*** (6.829) 2.838*** (3.489) 1.186** (2.281)
 
η2 (location parameter) 0.482*** (6.321) 1.881*** (3.880) 0.260** (2.473)
 
ς2(mass point) 0.787*** (10.553)
 
t statistics are in parentheses; ***, **, and * represents significance at 1, 5, and 10%, respectively; ς1 is 
normalized to 1.0 in estimation; the shape parameters δ j,m , with δ j,1 normalized, are not reported 
k
K 
=1 I j (m|X¯ , ηˆrk, ηˆpk, ηˆsk) pˆkh j (m|X¯) = . (11)K
(dm − dm−1) k=1 S(m, m, m|X¯ , ηˆrk, ηˆpk, ηˆsk) pˆk 
We also compute analogous rates for each of these two distinct groups of RTO cus­
tomers using (ηˆr1, ηˆp1, ηˆs1) and (ηˆr2, ηˆp2, ηˆs2), respectively, rather than averaging 
them out as above. 
The estimated conditional termination rates are presented in Fig. 1. For return, 
purchase, and skip, these rates are generally decreasing, increasing, and constant, 
respectively. Further, casual observation suggests the basic pattern of the raw termina­
tion rates resemble those of the overall conditional termination rates quite well. The 
ﬁgure also illustrates that the overall rate masks very different behavior among the 
two distinct groups of RTO customers; 56% of customers (= 1/(1 + 0.787)) fall in 
group one, the remaining 44% into group two. Note that ηˆ j1 > ηˆ j2 for all j = r, p, s 
suggesting that group one contracts tend to conclude faster. Furthermore, as this ratio 
is significantly greater for j = r than for j = p, s, the magnitude of the difference 
between the groups is starker for contracts concluding with merchandise return. We 
will explore these group differences in greater detail later. 
We now turn to the estimates of the competing risk model (Table 2). Most variables 
appear to be statistically significant in explaining the conditional probability of an 
2 
 
a 
b 
c 
Fig. 1 Raw and estimated conditional termination rates. a Return rate, top (bottom) solid line is group 1(2), 
overall is dashed; heavy line is raw rate. b Purchase rate, top (bottom) solid line is group 1(2), overall is 
dashed; heavy line is raw rate. c Skip rate. The ﬁgure compares the raw conditional termination rate (thick 
line) with that estimated by the model. The top, middle, and bottom panes present the return, purchase, and 
skip exits, respectively. In each pane, the highest to lowest lines represent the exit proportions for group 1, 
overall, and group 2, respectively; for added emphasis, a dashed line is used for the overall group. Com­
paring the overall estimate to that of the raw illustrates the general goodness of ﬁt. Note for the purchase 
exit the three estimated lines are nearly coincident, with group 1 having a noticeably higher probability for 
the latter part of the time interval 
RTO contract terminating via various exit routes; indeed all variables are significant at 
the 10% level for at least one exit and all but two are significant at 1%. In general, the 
demographic variables appear to have lower explanatory power relative to the other 
more transaction-speciﬁc variables. Also noteworthy is the highly significant nature 
of the contract structure variables. 
There is a known problem of interpreting regression coefﬁcients in competing risk 
models as it is not transparent how changes in a factor inﬂuence the probability of 
exit via a given route (see Thomas 1996). In general, one has to look at the relative 
magnitude of the coefﬁcients for all exits to draw a conclusive picture. The problem 
is further exacerbated by the incorporation of unobserved heterogeneity which allows 
correlation between risks. In order to illustrate the inﬂuence of each factor, we estimate 
the overall unconditional probability of exit I j (X) for j = r, p, s evaluating it at the 
various factor values. We compute this probability as: 
M+1 L 
I j (X) = I j (m |X ) (12) 
m=1 
I j (m|X) is estimated from (8) for  m = 1, 2, . . . , M ; for  the “>52” interval, we dis­
tribute Ic(M +1|X) among the three risk routes on the basis of the relative magnitude 
of I j (M |X). We also compute expected duration, conditional on exit via route j , as:  
M+1 L−1E j (X) = I md I j (m |X ) (13)j 
m=1 
where md is the mid-point of the class interval; for the “>52” interval, we use 72 
weeks as a mid-point. 
When all factors are evaluated at their mean levels, the unconditional probabilities 
of return, purchase, and loss are computed as 0.713, 0.250, and 0.036, respectively; 
with corresponding expected contract durations of 12.49, 57.10, and 30.11 weeks. 
In general, these values seem to match the data very well—see Table 1 for compari­
son. Further, Tables 3 and 4 compute the unconditional probability and corresponding 
expected duration for each factor at its 10th and 90th percentile values holding all 
other factors at their respective mean values. The information on expected durations 
supplements that on unconditional probabilities by estimating how long the contract is 
expected to last if it concludes via a particular exit. Hence, it provides information on 
how long an item was on rent, at what point the early purchase option was exercised, 
or when merchandise under agreement was written off as unrecoverable. 
Taken together, these simulation tables resolve the ambiguity of parameter evalua­
tion and allow some interesting observations. The relative impact of the demographic 
variables is generally weak in magnitude. Older (over 25) customers who are employed 
at least 6 months at their current job but at low wages are more likely to be purchasers 
and generally have a longer duration of an RTO contract regardless of exit. This is 
consistent with the notion that a key demographic for RTO is the “working poor.” That 
is, the older one gets, still employed at low wages, the fewer ﬁnancial options one has 
Table 3 Return, purchase, and loss probabilities evaluated at various factor values 
Variable 10th Percentile (90th Percentile) 
Value Return Purchase Skip 
Age (1 if > 25 years) 0.000 (1.000) 0.732 (0.701) 0.226 (0.266) 0.042 (0.033) 
Gender (1 if male) 0.000 (1.000) 0.708 (0.729) 0.257 (0.230) 0.035 (0.042) 
Marital status (1 if married) 0.000 (1.000) 0.714 (0.710) 0.246 (0.263) 0.040 (0.028) 
Employment (1 if > 6 months) 0.000 (1.000) 0.730 (0.694) 0.236 (0.266) 0.034 (0.040) 
Income 1.000 (4.000) 0.682 (0.751) 0.275 (0.219) 0.043 (0.030) 
Government aid (1 if aid) 0.000 (1.000) 0.690 (0.753) 0.262 (0.226) 0.049 (0.021) 
Referral (1 if referred) 0.000 (1.000) 0.720 (0.673) 0.241 (0.301) 0.039 (0.027) 
Payment frequency (weeks between) 1.000 (4.000) 0.798 (0.421) 0.166 (0.544) 0.035 (0.035) 
Maximum payable amount 0.381 (2.495) 0.656 (0.789) 0.308 (0.173) 0.035 (0.038) 
Contractual term 0.753 (1.552) 0.661 (0.749) 0.311 (0.209) 0.028 (0.042) 
Transactions to date 1.000 (6.000) 0.697 (0.737) 0.267 (0.224) 0.035 (0.038) 
Repeat customer (1 if repeat) 0.000 (1.000) 0.733 (0.687) 0.222 (0.285) 0.045 (0.028) 
Appliances dummy 0.000 (1.000) 0.705 (0.719) 0.237 (0.262) 0.057 (0.019) 
Electronics dummy 0.000 (1.000) 0.696 (0.751) 0.260 (0.192) 0.044 (0.057) 
Furniture dummy 0.000 (1.000) 0.720 (0.675) 0.224 (0.294) 0.056 (0.031) 
These probabilities are calculated at the 10th and 90th percentile value of each variable, with others evalu­
ated at their mean values. With all factors at their mean value, the probabilities of a return, purchase, and 
skip are 0.713, 0.250, and 0.036, respectively 
Table 4 Expected durations evaluated at various factor values 
Variable 10th Percentile (90th Percentile) 
Value Return Purchase Skip 
Age (1 if > 25 years) 0.00 (1.00) 11.554 (13.194) 55.974 (57.774) 28.664 (31.078) 
Gender (1 if male) 0.00 (1.00) 12.530 (12.383) 56.754 (58.060) 29.835 (30.899) 
Marital Status (1 if married) 0.00 (1.00) 12.428 (12.666) 57.180 (56.845) 30.149 (29.915) 
Employment (1 if > 6 months) 0.00 (1.00) 12.069 (13.004) 56.948 (57.228) 29.752 (30.530) 
Income 1.00 (4.00) 13.560 (11.348) 57.849 (55.914) 31.427 (28.533) 
Government aid (1 if aid) 0.00 (1.00) 13.077 (11.484) 57.570 (55.994) 30.878 (28.581) 
Referral (1 if referred) 0.00 (1.00) 12.254 (13.903) 57.064 (57.175) 29.952 (30.824) 
Payment frequency (weeks between) 1.00 (4.00) 10.677 (19.322) 56.570 (56.444) 28.608 (34.604) 
Maximum payable amount 0.38 (2.50) 12.248 (13.137) 51.794 (62.077) 26.284 (35.753) 
Contractual term 0.75 (1.55) 8.276 (17.079) 29.139 (64.746) 17.170 (41.909) 
Transactions to date 1.00 (6.00) 12.926 (11.880) 57.048 (57.119) 30.307 (29.794) 
Repeat customer (1 if repeat) 0.00 (1.00) 11.651 (13.656) 56.541 (57.660) 29.154 (31.157) 
Appliances dummy 0.00 (1.00) 12.560 (12.749) 57.826 (57.218) 30.720 (30.059) 
Electronics dummy 0.00 (1.00) 13.018 (11.555) 57.634 (58.009) 30.895 (30.192) 
Furniture dummy 0.00 (1.00) 12.557 (12.970) 58.622 (55.347) 31.435 (28.948) 
These expected durations are conditional on route-speciﬁc exit and are evaluated at the 10th and 90th per­
centile value of each variable, with others at their mean values. With all factors at their mean value, expected 
durations of a return, purchase, and skip are 12.49, 57.10, and 30.11, respectively 
and so the more valuable RTO is as a mechanism to acquire needed goods (see also 
Zikmund-Fisher and Parker 1999). Also intriguing, the probability of a skip is notably 
higher for a young male. 
As one might expect, for a repeat customer the expected duration is longer for all 
exits and the probability of purchase is higher, while those for return and skip are 
smaller. This might simply reﬂect satisfaction over the earlier transaction(s). Alterna­
tively, it may be that a customer having a continuing need for RTO is likely to be more 
reliant on this method of acquisition. Interestingly, the transactions to date variable 
has the exact opposite effect on exit probabilities, probably reﬂecting the effect of 
customers exercising the embedded option of merchandise exchange. For example, 
a good may be returned in order to exchange it for a similar item—e.g., a customer 
renting a TV then returning it and, nearly simultaneously, renting a different TV, possi­
bly repeating such an exchange several times. This represents an important consumer 
option to resolve uncertainty over a good’s utility without having to suffer “buyer’s 
remorse.” 
One key result concerns the payment frequency variable. Going from a weekly to 
a monthly schedule, the overall return probability almost halves (going from 0.798 to 
0.421), while the purchase probability triples (0.166 to 0.544). Arguably there is pre­
selection of payment schedules by customers. In other words, those expecting to rent 
prefer a weekly arrangement for the greater ﬂexibility offered, while those expecting 
to purchase prefer monthly for the greater convenience. We believe that pre-selection 
alone may not fully account for this periodicity-related effect. First, the demographic 
variables included in the analysis partially control for the pre-selection effect since 
they are likely to be correlated with the borrower’s intentions. Second, as noted above, 
group one seems to have much more of a rental motive than does group two and yet the 
same qualitative pattern is observed, going from weekly to monthly, for both groups 
of customers (see Table 5, discussed below). 
We conjecture that the above result also has a behavioral component, although it 
cannot be isolated from the regression results. A standard economic model would 
predict that consumers ﬁnance purchases so that, for a given discount rate, the present 
value of payments is minimized. Prelec and Loewenstein (1998) argue that the reality 
of consumer hedonics is quite different. When people ﬁnance their purchases, they 
experience a pain that can undermine the pleasure derived from consumption. They 
argue that the pain of paying plays an important role in self-regulation and propose 
a mental accounting model that incorporates the interactions between the pleasures 
of consumption and the pain of paying. Using a concept of coupling, which refers 
to the degree by which consumption reminds the consumer of payment, they argue 
that ﬁnancing methods such as credit cards have a much weaker coupling as opposed 
to cash payments. In a similar vein, we believe that periodicity of payments exerts a 
strong inﬂuence on coupling and is important in consumer decision-making. Consum­
ers tend to evaluate their decisions at discrete points in time and the perceived cost 
associated with making a payment is somewhat reduced when the evaluation points 
are spread out. 
The contractual term variable, despite having a 1% significant negative coefﬁcient 
for every exit, implies that longer contracts increase (decrease) the probability of 
return (purchase) and result in a greater probability of a loss. Consistent with Table 2, 
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expected durations increase with contractual term for all exits. This could be viewed 
as saying simply that acquisition is less likely the longer the contractual term, even 
though the contract may still run a long time. Comparing the changes in expected 
duration in Table 4 shows an interesting phenomenon. As the contractual term varies 
between 0.75 years (39 weeks) and 1.55 years (80.6 weeks), the expected durations 
of the contract change proportionately for all exits. For instance, for a return, the 
ratio of expected duration to contractual term equals 21% whether evaluated at their 
10th percentile values (8.28/39.0 = 0.212) or at their 90th (17.08/80.6 = 0.212). 
Although somewhat simplistic, this analysis makes a compelling case that consumers 
adjust their decision time scale to account for differences in contractual term, perhaps 
due to time-varying discount factors used in valuing payments (see Frederick et al. 
2002). Alternatively, consumers evaluate the options embedded in these agreements 
and that such options have a natural exercise point. 
We also note that for the electronics dummy there is a higher probability of return 
or skip and a lower probability of purchase. This is consistent with electronics items 
being viewed as luxury goods as well as the notion consumers are using RTO to 
acquire essential household items, namely furniture and appliances. Support for this 
view comes from the increase in the probability of purchase when the item is either 
an appliance or furniture as well as relatively lower probabilities of return and skip. 
The results on unconditional probabilities and expected durations in Tables 3 and 
4 can be used to gain insight into the ﬁnancing cost associated with RTO agreements. 
They illustrate the trade-offs and cross-subsidization implicit in the RTO contractual 
arrangement. It is noteworthy that skips, returns, and early purchasers are subsidized by 
those paying to term. For a given contract, the periodic payment, which is proportional 
to the store’s mark-up, is inﬂuenced by the purchase, return, and skip probabilities and 
their corresponding expected durations. Further, by conditioning these estimates on the 
various values of the demographic, contract structure, and repeat customer variables, 
arguably more realistic expected annual percentage rates (APRs) can be calculated 
using the procedure described in footnote 10. With high return probabilities and with 
expected durations considerably shorter than the corresponding contractual terms, the 
estimated APR are much less than extant APR estimates which assume payments 
made to term (e.g., Freedman 1993). Further, we can show that the APRs computed 
for weekly contracts, for example, are considerably smaller than their monthly coun­
terparts. Similar subgroup cost comparisons can also be made. For example, APRs 
on electronics, as a class, can be shown to be less than those on appliances which are 
less than those on furniture. In the case of electronics, this is driven by relatively high 
probabilities of return and skip as well as generally shorter durations. 
Tables 5 and 6 present unconditional probabilities and expected durations for the 
two distinct groups of RTO customers. At ﬁrst pass, group one appears to be composed 
of pure renters as there is a 94.7% chance of return and nearly equal probabilities of 
purchase (2.7%) and skip (2.6%)—i.e., they seem to have a well-deﬁned short-term 
need and so renting is more cost-effective than purchase. In contrast, for group two, 
the majority of transactions are expected to lead to purchase (53.8%), while return 
occurs 41.2% of the time and the skip rate, at 5%, is nearly twice that for group one. A 
possible interpretation of group two members is that they are ﬁnancially constrained 
with an income stream that is low mean/high variance, i.e., they represent one’s a 

 
priori notion of the typical RTO customer. Such an income distribution would serve 
as a catalyst for a change in circumstance either positive—leading to a purchase or 
return, depending on the early purchase option’s value—or negative—necessitating 
an involuntary return or even a skip, thereby accounting for their relatively higher pur­
chase and skip rates. The above interpretation is supported by the expected durations 
in Table 6 which show, regardless of exit, deals conclude much faster for group one 
(group two contracts take at least 2.5 times as long to conclude). In general, group 
one customers seem to value the embedded put option, i.e., the right to terminate the 
transaction at any point, returning the item without adverse ﬁnancial consequence. 
In contrast, group two are purchasers valuing the embedded call—which lets them 
convert their rental agreement into the right to own. These differences in contract 
usage lead to significant cross-subsidization of groups. Using the same assumptions 
as in Sect. 3—which lead to an overall APR of 91%—group one’s APR is estimated 
at 33%, while group two faces an APR of 185%. 
To gain additional insights, Fig. 2 presents the conditional termination rates for 
return under two scenarios: a contract requiring weekly payments having a relatively 
long duration, and one with monthly payments and a short duration. Rationality sug­
gests that the former contractual terms would be preferred by a renter to maximize 
ﬂexibility and minimize rental costs, while the latter would be preferred by a pur­
chaser to maximize convenience. At the same time, as discussed earlier, subsequent 
consumer behavior is also inﬂuenced by contract structure. Focusing on the overall 
rate, the ﬁgure shows that the monthly/short customer has a relatively low termination 
rate that declines by an order of magnitude over the period—going from 2 to 0.2%. 
In contrast, the weekly/long customer probability of return starts 3.5 times larger and 
while it declines faster early on, it continues to be well above the monthly/short rate. 
Arguably pre-selection is likely to be dominant early in the contract whereas any 
behavioral effect would gradually build. The narrowing of the distance between the 
termination rates under two scenarios is perhaps indicative of a reduced pre-selection 
effect. However, the persistence of a significant difference is, we believe, due to behav­
ioral reasons. Also interesting is the variation between groups. Group one return rates 
are highest, regardless of scenario, and focusing on the weekly/short contract rein­
forces the notion that customers in group one are renters, as their return probabilities 
are, on average, ﬁve times that of the overall rate. It also highlights the magnitude of 
the inﬂuence of the unobserved factors since the group one return probability under a 
monthly/short contract dominates that of group two’s probability under a weekly/long 
contract over the entire interval. 
5 Conclusion 
This article provides a comprehensive multiple destination analysis for RTO contracts. 
A competing risk methodology is employed that accounts for unobserved heterogene­
ity among borrowers and estimates this simultaneously with ﬂexible baseline hazards 
associated with the possible exits. In particular, we analyze the return, purchase, and 
skip probabilities, thus providing useful information on the characteristics of renters 
and purchasers. 
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Fig. 2 Estimated termination rates of return under two scenarios. The ﬁgure contrasts two scenarios: 
(a) weekly payment schedule and relatively long contract length (dashed lines) with (b) monthly schedule 
and short length (solid lines). Within each scenario, the highest to lowest lines represent group 1, overall, 
and group 2, respectively; to emphasize the overall lines they are drawn thick 
Our results support the notion that that RTO represents an important means of 
acquisition for the “working poor.” For example, older consumers on the current job 
at least 6 months but at low wages have a higher probability of purchase and, regard­
less of outcome, a longer expected contract duration. In general, however, we ﬁnd 
that the demographic variables have weak explanatory power on contract outcomes 
relative to the contract structure variables. For instance, payment schedules—weekly, 
biweekly, or monthly—have a very strong effect on contract outcome and duration. 
Contrasting weekly to monthly payment schedules, we ﬁnd the former more likely to 
result in return and to conclude faster. While there is a pre-selection explanation for 
the contract structure variables, we believe that these results also ﬁt the general notion 
that consumers mentally track the cost and beneﬁts of a transaction with a symbolic 
linkage between consumption and the way the purchase is ﬁnanced (see, e.g., Prelec 
and Loewenstein 1998; Thaler 1985). Finally, there is interesting variation across types 
of merchandise with electronics more likely to be rented, and appliances and furniture 
more likely to be purchased. 
The unobserved heterogeneity is also found to be quite important in accounting 
for customer behavior. The model allows two distinct population groups of RTO cus­
tomers with differing motives for entering a transaction. As a rough characterization, 
we ﬁnd that the population is nearly equally split between pure renters and those 
seemingly dependent on RTO as a possible means of acquisition. Further, for a given 
consumer, group membership has a significant effect on contract usage. 
We believe that our rational and behavioral explanations of consumer behavior in 
the RTO market can be generalized to other consumer loan markets. For instance, the 
results of our article may have general implications for linkage of contract structure 
with the consumer handling of debt instruments. Also, some of the our demographic 
insights may map in a more general setting. Further, since consumers are expected to 
have varying motivations, both observed and unobserved, behind their participation 
in any contractual relationship, this needs to be accounted for in the initial contract 
design and pricing. 
RTO agreements have recently received considerable public attention. Several arti­
cles in the extant literature using somewhat unreliable survey data imply that most 
RTO consumers are potential purchasers of goods at usurious interest rates. However, 
the high incidence of returns in our transactions data seems to belie the prevailing inter­
pretation, by some, of RTO customers as uninformed or unsophisticated. The results 
also illustrate the trade-offs and cross-subsidization implicit in the RTO contractual 
arrangement. It is noteworthy that skips and early-purchasers are alike in that both 
are subsidized by those who pay to term. This is analogous to the credit card market 
where both defaulters and those not incurring interest charges are being subsidized by 
those making only minimum payments. We compute effective interest rates paid by 
RTO customers which are significantly smaller than the generally reported APRs. 
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